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{
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THAYN CONSTRUCTION
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Appeal From the Judgment of the Third District Court
For Salt Lake County, Utah
HoNoRABLE STEWART M. HANSON, Judge
H. ARNOLD RICH and
LEONARD W. ELTON
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CLARENCE JACK FROST
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH

J. B. & R. E. W ALI{ER, INC.,
a Utah Corporation and

J. B. WALKER and GUDVOR W.
BRABY, dba WALKER SAND &
GRAVEL, ~co~MP'ANY, a
{
partnership,

Plaintiff- Respondent,

-vs.-

\
(

Case
No.10224

J. KENNETH THAYN dba
THAYN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,
Defenda;nt -Appellant.

BRIEF O·F RESPONDENT

Respondent does not agree with the Statement of
Facts or Statement of the Case as set forth in Brief of
Appellant; primarily they are so inadequate and inaccurate as to be of little or no aid to this Court in understanding the issues presented to and determined by the Trial
Court from 'vhich this appeal is taken. Respondent,

l
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therefore, deen1s it important to restate the ease so far
as it relates to the points argued by Appellant.
This appeal is concerned with only the first cause
of action and the defenses presented by the pleadings and
attempted to be established by the evidence.

ISSUES: Plaintiff's first cause of action alleges
the making of a lease on April 11, 1961, between the
corporate plaintiff and defendant; that defendant had
breached the contract by ( 1) assigning and conveying the
same without the written consent of plaintiff, contrary
to its written terms ; ( 2) by failure to pay taxes and
rental as required by the lease terms; and (3) by failure
to cause the leased area to be surveyed and fenced as
required by the lease. (R. 1, 2, 3, 9 and 10).
Defendant admitted making the lease but denied
that he had violated its terms; denied that he had assigned the lease; and alleged that his failure to pay taxes
and rentals was due to plaintiff's failure to designate
and survey the particular area to be covered by the lease.
(R. 21). 'Thereafter, in response to an affidavit by plaintiff alleging that the denial was untrue, sham and frivolous, (R. 25, 26) that plaintiff had seen such an assignment to one James C. Sumsion, defendant then (R. 31)
alleged that if plaintiff was referring to the agreement
between defendant and Richard Sumsion and James
Sumsion, such agreement was only temporary and tentative and that defendant had discussed the agreement
with plaintiff. Defendant, shortly before trial, then
filed another amendment to his answer alleging that if
the ~Court found that there was such an assignment,
plaintiff had waived any objections to it.

2
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The complaint further alleged that plaintiff had
served a notice of termination, but defendant would not
remove himself from the leased pre·mises; that defendant was continuing in possession by his assignee, Sumsion; that defendant was denying any violation; and that
it was essential to have the Court deelare 'vhether there
had or had not been a termination of the lease by reason
of the violations by defendant.
These were the issues presented by the pleadings,
so far as the first cause of action was concerned.
FACTS: There was little or no dispute as to the

essential facts; they were either stip·ulated or admitted.
The particular leasehold provisions (R. 9) are as follows:
"1. The Lessor hereby leases to the Lessee,
for a term of fifteen (15) years, from the date of
execution of this agreement, sufficient property
located on the east side of Wasatch Boulevard, approximately three hundred feet north of the roadbase storage area, occupied by Lessor, all in Section 23 and 24, Township 2 South, Range 1 E.ast,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, for the purpose set
forth hereinabove, with the further provision
that the Lessee, taking into consideration the requirements necessary, will designate the area
needed, which area will then be surveyed and the
description of said property will be attached
hereto and made a part hereof, as a supplemental
agreement.

"3. The L.essee agrees to pay the Lessor the
sum of One ($1.00) Dollar per year, plus the prorata property tax, as lease rental for the premises
described herein.
"4. The Lessee shall have the right to bring
upon, install and operate upon the leased prem3
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ises, all of the equipment of whatver kind
necessary to operate and maintain the machinery
enumerated hereinabove ; provided, however, that
all operations of the Lessee upon said property
shall be in such a manner as not to create a nuisance or a hazard to the public; that the property
be adequately fenced; and that existing laws and
regulations of the State of Utah be complied with
in the operation of said premises, machinery and
equipment.
"8. :The Lessee agrees not to assign this lease
or any part thereof or any of the rights hereunder,
without first obtaining the written consent of
the Lessor."
Under date of November 12, 1963, defendant made
an agreement, (Ex. P-1) vvith Richard Sumsion and
James C. Sumsion, which was admitted in evidence without objection. (R. 62-64). The pertinent portions are as
follows:
"'This Agreement made and entered into this
12th day of November, 1963, by and between J.
KE,NNE!TH THAYN, doing business as TH.AYN
CO:NS'TRUCTION COMPANY, hereinafter called
''TIHAYN' and RI CHARD M. SUMSION, and
JAME,S C. 'SUMSION, jointly, hereinafter called
'SUMSION,' and
1

"WHEREAS, Thayn is the owner of a certain lease-hold interest which he desires to assign
to Sumsion, and
"WHERE:AS, Thayn is the owner of certain
personal property which he desires to sell to
Sumsion, and
"WHE~REAS

Sumsion desires to lease the
said lease-hold interest and to buy the said personal property,
4
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"NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of
the mutual covenants of each of the parties, IT
IS HERE·BY AGREED:
"1. ·That there is a certain lease-hold agreement between J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., as Lessors, and J. Kenneth ·Thayn, as L·essee, which
lease is represented by an agreement, a copy of
\vhich is attached as Exhibit 1. ·Thayn is the
owner of a certain agreement dated April 11,
19'61, between himself and J. B. Walker and
Gudvor W. Brady, a copy of which agreement
is attached, incorporated and made a part of
this agreement as Exhibit 2.

"2. Thayn does by this instrument assign to
Sumsion all right, title and interest that he has
in the said agreements attached as Exhibit 1 and
Exhibit 2 for the remaining portion of the term
and Sumsion agrees to pay Thayn for said agreements the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) per year,
said payment to be made on or before the lOth
day of April of each year, commencing with the
lOth day of April, 19·64, except that if ·Sumsion
fails to make payments as agreed upon in paragraph 8, this lease-hold shall revert back to
Thayn.
"3. In the event that Sumsion is compelled
to cease operation in resp·ect to the asphalt hot
plant operation within a period of two (2) years
from the date of this agreement as a result of
court order, Thayn shall move and erect original
equipment at his expense to any location in Salt
Lake 'County designated by Sumsion. Sumsion
shall assume all costs of securing property or
lease at the new designated location and all other
expenses beyond said move and erection.
1

"4. It is contemplated that Sumsion will place
upon the leasehold property buildings, fixtures
5
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and other imp.rovements, which will remain the
property of Sumsion and at the expiration of
this lease agreement, or if the said agreement is
terminated by any means, Sumsion shall have
the right to remove all buildings, fixtures and
improvements placed upon the said property
including fences."
'
On January 1, 1964, plaintiff sent a statement to
defendant for $1,050.00 for a proportionate share of the
taxes for the years 1961, 1962. and 1963 (Ex. P-2). Defendant admitted that he received the statement, had not
paid it and had paid no taxes or other amounts called for
by the statement (R. 64 and E,x. P-2).
Defendant admitted that he never designated the
specific area to be occupied by him (R. 65). No fence
was ever erected (R. 76). No consent in writing to the
assignment was ever had (R. 78, 79).
Sumsion knew and understood that defendant could
not assign the lease without the written consent of
plaintiff (R. 81, 82). Shortly thereafter Sumsion went
into possession (R. 83) and then came to request plaintiff
to approve the assignment (R. 84) and was informed by
letter as to the terms upon which an approval could be
obtained. Sumsion has remained in possession and purchased material and occupied the premises under a
tentative arrangement with plaintiff until the matter
was settled.
No adjustment of the problem having been had,
plaintiff then served the notice of termination on April
10, 19'64·. (Ex. P-3).
6
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ARGU~1ENT

POINT I
THE COURT DID NO'T ABUSE ITS DISCRETIO·N IN
SE'TTING 'THE FIRST CAUSE O·F ACTION FOR TRIAL
AS APPRO,PRIATE FO·R DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN
ADVANCE ·O·F HEARING ON 'THE OTHER CAUSES O·F
ACTION.

The Complaint alleges eight causes of action. The
first cause alleges the dispute as to vvhether the leasehold
agreement has or has not been ter1ninated by reason of
the breaches by defendant and the notice of termination
by plaintiff, with defendant remaining in possession by
and through his assignee, Sumsion.

The ren1aining causes of action have to do with
responsibility for costs of litigation instituted by neighbors for clailned creation of nuisance, and efforts by the
·County to abate the operations of defendant under the
zoning la-vvs. In addition there were claims for damag2s
for failure to pay for materials delivered.
It is clearly evident that the first cause of action
is severable frorn the others; and there was no reason
for tying up this property under a contract that had
been tern1inated by breach and that had resulted so disastrously to the contracting parties, not only in cost of
litigation but also in disclosure of contract deficiencies
as a basis for a working agreement. Defendant testified
(R. 69), that the lease contract was drawn without legal
assistance, and it was not adequate in its provisions as
to who should bear the burdens of defending nuisance
actions instituted by reason of the hot plant operations

7
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of defendant. In characteristic fashion defendant refused
to assun1e the cost of defense of these rnatters, and plaintiff had no alternative but to defend his right to conduct
hot plant operations on his ground.
'There were three grounds alleged for rescission about
vvhich there was no material dispute: (1) assignment of
the contract without written consent; (2) failure of defendant to designate and fence the area occupied; and
( 3) refusal to pay the taxes on that portion of the tract;
all of \vhich were clearly set forth as obligations of the
defendant in the contract, and all of \\ hich had been
violated by defendant.
7

The co1nplaint \vas filed :Wlay 6, 1964, and on I\lay
26, 1964, defendant obtained an order giving him to and
including June 2, 1964, within which to answer; and then
he filed only denial of the alleged violations.
Plaintiff thereupon filed an affida-vit as to the fact
that the denial was sharn and untrue, and moved the
Court for an order setting the case for im1nediate trial
of the first cause of action. This motion \vas argued
on June 12, 1964. Thereafter the trial was set for July
9, 1964, and then reset for July 21, 196-±, before Hon.
Stewart Thi. Hanson.
As soon as defendant received the first notice of
setting on J-uly 1, 1964, he irnrnediately filed numerous
papers arnending his pleadings and setting up 1nany
r~asons \Yhy the trial shoula not be had. All of these
1natt(\rs \Yere heard by the Court a.t the tin1e set for
8
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hearing, and the objections were over-ruled and the case
was heard. Defendant 'vas given the fullest opportunity
to present whatever evidence he had, and defendant's
brief does not shovv any prejudice to defendant. lie had
had t-vvo and a half n1onths to prepare his defense. It is
difficult indeed to say that you haven't assigned a lease
\Vhen the written assignment is before the Court; and it
is difficult to show that you have paid the taxes when
you have to admit that you haven't; and it is impossible
to say that the other fellow is to designate the area and
do some fencing when the contract expressly says that
you are to do it. Defendant had nothing to go on, and
he didn't go anyvvhere.
This case comes squarely within the provisions of
Sec. 78-33-1, Sec. 78-33-2 and 78-33-3 of the Judicial Code
relating to Declaratory J udg1nents. It also comes squarely vvithin the purvie"\v of Rules 56 and 57.
Only the wildest imagination would cause an individual to say that a decree declaring a leasehold contract
to be terminated is not final as to the existence or nonexistence of the document as a binding docu1nent.

POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THA·T DEFEND:ANTS' ACTIONS HAD GIVEN PLAINTIFF THE
RIGHT TO 'TERMINATE, CANCEL AND ANNUL THE
RIGHTiS OF DEFENDANT TO 'THE LEASEHOLD AGR,EEMENT.

The Court properly found the lease had been terininated by reason of breaches of the agreement by defend9
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ant; and properly held there had been no \Va1ver by
plaintiff.
As before stated, plaintiff relied upon three breaches
for its right of termination: ( 1) assignment without
written consent; (2) failure to pay taxes; (3) failure
to designate the area to be utilized and to fence the same.
The facts were undisputed as to each and all of the
breaches. Defendant admitted that he had never had
written consent to the assignment; that he had never
paid the taxes and that he had never designated the
area to be occupied nor fe:q.ced the same.
The English language seems to have little or no
meaning to defendant. The lease agreement expressly
provides in Paragraph 1 that the lessee will designate
the area needed, have it surveyed, and the area thus
described will he added as a supplement to the agreement,
which \Vas never done. Paragraph 3 expressly provides
that the lessee agrees to pay to the lessor the pro-rata
of property taxes based upon the ratio of that area to
the whole tract. Paragraph 4 expressly provides that
the lessee will fence the area. The only answer defendant
makes to this failure is stated by the attorney for defendant, Mr. Frost, in the following language:
"Yes vve will admit that he did not, and we
will contend that this is an agreement and obli. gation of Walker as provided in the agreement."
Apparently the English language 1neans no more to
the attorney for defendant than it does to defendant
himself.

10
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On Page 16 of the transcript, M.r. Thayn says the
reason he did nothing about fencing was because 1fr.
y·y- alker was supposed to designate the area.
On the taxes he says the reason he didn't pay the
taxes was because the ·County "\vas supposed to segregate
the amounts. On Page 17 he says he didn't make the
tax payment because the County hadn't said it was fair.
By the simple process of failing to designate the area,
he felt entirely relieved from all responsibility to pay
taxes on the tract occupied by hin1, and yet this was the
only rental he was supposed to pay aside from the nominal amount of $1.00 per year, which he didn't pay either.
The defendant tried to appear "dumb," somewhat of a
country bumpkin who didn't quite understand the meaning of words. His failure to put up any money, even
for taxes, while occupying the premises rent free for three
(3) years, from April11, 19·61, to the date of termination
on April 10, 1964, shows, however, that he was not as
dumb as he tried to appear; and in selling his equipment
to Sumsion for $128,000 with $25,000 down and interest
at 55'o, shows that he seems to know his finances o.k.
Just before trial defendant abandoned his denials,
abandoned his position that the assignment was not the
real thing but tentative only, and finally came to rest
upon the allegation that plaintiff had waived the alleged
breaches.
There was no evidence whatsoever that plaintiff
\Vaived the require1nent to designate the area or to pay
the taxes or to fence it, and the nearest that defendant
11
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came to proving even the slightest sen1blance of a \vaiver
is contained on Page 69 of the transcript 'vherein ~ir.
Thayn testified that sometin1e priol· to the time he n1ade
the deal '"-rith l\1r. Sumsion, he told l\1r. vValker that hP
vvas getting old and that he 'vould like to get out of hard
construction \Vork, and he had talked with Mr. Sumsion,
and Mr. Walker thought it would be a good idea (R.
69-70).
lie also produced evidence that JYir. \V alker kne·w

that Sumsion had gone into possession and that Mr.
Walker thereafter made some sales to Sumsion and that
Walker rnade no objection to Mr. Sumsion operating the
property (R. 73). Ho,vever, it then appeared upon crossexamination (R. 78-79) that the agreement between defendant and Sumsion was prepared by the attorneys
for the parties, and the following evidence was produced
upon cross-examination of l\{r. Thttyn (R. 78):

"0

\.!"

Did you or anyone else, at that time,
advise Mr. Sumsion or any of his attorneys that your original lease with
Walker was not assignable unless you
got his consent in writing~

"A. I think they "rere a\Yare of it because "Q.

Thank you. That answers it. As a
1natter of fact, ~Ir. 'Thayn, at any time,
including to the present day, have you
ever obtained a consent in writing from
the vV alkers regarding your right to
assign that lease~

"A. "\V ell, I don't know· as it has been particularly put that 'vay. ,v~ e told the1n
they \vere going up there, and they gave

12
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us an agreement. Don't try to answer
me if I a1n dumb. Let it go that way,
but the way you put it isn't the truth."
Mr. Richard Sumsion, called as a witness for defendant, testified that when he made this agreement with
1Ir. 'fhayn he read the agreement, that he read the covenant in there that ·Thayn was not to assign the lease
without the written consent of Walker (R. 81); that he
definitely understood it (R. 82); that after Inaking his
agreement \vith Thayn he and his attorney caine up to
the office of the attorney for vV alker with the request
the vValker approve the assignment of the contract, and
that thereafter he received a letter setting forth the
reasons why it could not be done. He then made an independent arrangement with l\1r. Walker under which
he had been receiving and purchasing material pending
a settlement of this litigation with ~Jr. Thayn; that his
occupancy of the premises and purchase of materials
\Vas under that tentative me1norandu1n, not under the
Thayn lease.
It will thus be seen that while defendant quotes
lR\V \vith reference to \vaiver, his facts do not fit the
la\v; there was no waiver, and the Court found that there
was no waiver, and the evidence sustains the finding.
This case come squarely within the provisions of
three Utah cases. They represent the law of this case
as pronounced by this Court and as followed by the
District Court: Powerine Compa.ny vs. Russell's, Inc.,
et al, 103 Dtah 441, 135 P.2d 906; Powerine Company vs.
Zions Savings Bank & Trust Company, 106 Utah 384,

13
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148 P.2d 807. In this case the ·Court restated its findings
in the forn1cr case in the follo\ving language:
"That the lease executed by defendant John
I-I. Russell, leasing certain real property to plaintiff was not assignable, and therefore by assigning
such lease plaintiff breached its conditions so that
John H. R.ussell "\Yas entitled to recission."
To similar effect is the 1nost recent case of Gates
22.?.
vs. Daines, 3 Ut.2d 95, ~ P.2d 458.
In this connection it is very significant that the
agreement (Ex. P-1) between ·Thayn and Sumsion provides in Paragraph 3 that in the event Sumsion is colnpelled to cease operation in respect to the asphalt hot
plant within a period of t\vo years as the result of
court order, "·Thayn shall move and erect original equipment at his expense to any location in Salt Lake ~county
designated by Sumsion." 'I'his is certainly a most unusual
provision to be contained in a contract based upon an
assun1ption t:nat consent has been obtained to assignment
of the lease, and that the equipment \Yas to remain on the
property during the period of the lease term in accordance with the provisions of the lease from Walker to
Thayn. It is more consistent \Yith the idea that the
parties knew they \Yere doing so1nething \Yhich might
or might not be approved or "~hich 1night or 1night not
result in litigation, and "\Vere providing a \Yay out for the
parties the1nselves \\'"ithout regard to \\Talker or anyone
else.

14
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POINrr III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE
AGREEMiE·NT BE'T'WEEN DE;FENDANT AND SUM.SIO~N
WAS AN AS~SIGNMENT, NO~T A SUB-LE~ASE.

The agreement on November 12, 1963, between Thayn
and Sumison is an assignment, not a sub-lease.
Here again defendant quotes law to the effect that
a sub-lease is not a violation of a covenant against assignment, but the facts do not fit the law. P'aragraph 8
of the lease forbids "assignment of the lease or any part
thereof or any of the rights hereunder" without first
obtaining the vvritten consent of the lessor. The restriction is broader than ordinary restrictions. Obviously the
reason for it was the fact that the lessee was paying
little or nothing for the privilege of occupying the prernises ,and the lessor was reserving to himself the right
to determine who vvould or would not be the occupant,
and the conditions under which the occupancy vvas to
be had. It was entirely within the right of Walker to
refuse assignment of a lease which had proven so fruitful
of litigation with neighbors, the County, and even with
the defendant himself. If the clearest English and the
1nost positive obligations with reference to fencing,
designation of area, and payment of taxes could not be
understood by defendant, and the clearest of language
against assignment of the leasehold rights or any part
thereof, or any interest therein, could not be comprehended and understood by anyone as successful as Mr.
Thayn and as intelligent as his counsel, what then was
the use of perpetuating that document by having it assigned to others~

15
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It is little short of an affront to the intelligence of
this Court to argue that the follo,ving \vords, "Thayn doP~
by this instrument assign to Sumsion all right, title
and interest that he has in said agreements attached a~
Exhibit 1 and 2 for the remaining portion of the tern1"
does not mean \vhat it says. Nothing \vhatsoever is rPserved to Thayn save and excepting that it is provided
in the sa1ne paragraph that if Sumsion fails to make
payments on the purchase price of equipment he is
buying, the leasehold shall revert to Thayn. There was
no reversionary interest as referred to in the authorities
cited in the brief, nor \Yas the occupancy of the preinises
by Sumsion to be in any way contingent upon or subject
to any supervisory right of Thayn during the lease
term. The document was what it states - a complete
assignment of the lease and to be absolute and not contingent in any way if Sumsion n1ade the payments for
\vhich he was legally obligated. There \Yas no such thing
as a reversionarv interest as such an interest is kno,vn
in the law.
oJ

This point is raised no\v for the first time on appeal.
Defendant never pleaded that the assignment was in
fact a sublease. He denied it existed; then said it ·was
tentative only; and then said it vvas \vaived; but he never
presented to the Trial Court the proposition that it \vas
in fact a sub-lease. Nevertheless, he \Yas wrong here as he
\Vas in the other positions that he took.
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Plaintiff submits to this ·Court that the matter "\Vas
properly handled by the District Court, properly decided,
and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
H. ARNO~L,D RICH and
LEONARD· W. E.L.TON
510 American Oil Building
Salt Lake ·City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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